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THE COLOR OF FEAR: A COGNITIVE-RHETORICAL ANALYSIS
OF HOW FLORIDA’S SUBJECTIVE FEAR STANDARD IN STAND
YOUR GROUND CASES RATIFIES RACISM
ELIZABETH ESTHER BERENGUER*
It must be remembered that the visibility of race was used as a tool
to consolidate domination, to seize land, and to recruit and extract
mass labor. All this is still going on today. The racism of the past
is still active in the present.1
INTRODUCTION
Alicia Garza, Opal Tometi, and Patrisse Cullors created
#BlackLivesMatter movement as “a response to the anti-Black racism that
permeates our society.”2 They established this movement at a moment in
time when “Trayvon Martin was [posthumously] placed on trial for his own
murder and the killer, George Zimmerman, was not held accountable for the
crime he committed.”3 This Essay analyzes the statutory structure that
legalized, legitimized, and ratified Martin’s murder.
When Trayvon Martin was shot and killed, Florida’s Stand Your
Ground laws took center stage on the national scene.4 Many decried
Zimmerman’s killing of Martin as outright murder, but Zimmerman was not
convicted because this type of homicide in Florida is not only justified—it is
legal.5 The Stand Your Ground statutory scheme was enacted to permit just

© 2017 Elizabeth Esther Berenguer.
*
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1. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 249
(2015).
2. Alicia Garza, A HerStory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement, BLACKLIVESMATTER,
http://blacklivesmatter.com/herstory/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
3. Id.
4. See FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012, 776.013, 776.031, 776.032 (2016).
5. See Michael H. Cottman, Commentary: Zimmerman Acquittal Says It’s Open Season on
AM.
WEB
(July
14,
2013),
Black
Males,
BLACK
http://blackamericaweb.com/2013/07/14/zimmerman-acquittal-black-teens/; Richard Thompson
Ford, The Law that Acquitted Zimmerman Isn’t Racist: But That Doesn’t Mean the Outcome Wasn’t,
NEW REPUBLIC (July 16, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/113873/zimmerman-trial-racistlaws. Cottman noted:
The acquittal of George Zimmerman, who shot and killed unarmed black teenager
Trayvon Martin, has led many to indict the jury that delivered the verdict as racists. But
because of Florida’s lax laws on self-defense and problems with the prosecution’s case,
the verdict was probably justified. The real injustice is that what Zimmerman did was
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this sort of killing.6 In 2005, Florida’s legislature abolished the duty to retreat
so that anyone who feared an attack could meet force with force and kill with
impunity; in essence, the state legalized homicide.7
The impact of legalizing homicide extends far beyond the death count.
As the founders of the #BlackLivesMatter movement have aptly recognized,
acquittal and non-prosecution of homicides are deeply infected by endemic,
long-standing racism.8 Florida’s Stand Your Ground laws employ a
subjective fear standard coupled with immunity from prosecution, which
perpetuates racism in that it ratifies and propagates the implicit biases that
cause us to fear “the Other,” especially Black male “Others,” however
irrational that fear may be.9
Part I of this Essay explores cognitive theory as it relates to race and
fear, and more particularly why the brain perceives the Other (especially
Black Male Others) as a threat. It utilizes the “suspicion heuristic”10 to
analyze how the subjective fear standard ratifies implicit bias and racism.11
Some scholars have studied Stand Your Ground laws through the lens of the
suspicion heuristic to analyze how application of the reasonable person
standard absolves racially biased acts.12 This Essay takes that analysis a step
further by analyzing the impact of a subjective fear standard. This Part
concludes that subjective standards not only absolve negative race-based
behaviors but actually ratify, condone, and perpetuate implicit biases and
racist beliefs.
Part II explains Florida’s Stand Your Ground statutory scheme and the
legislature’s intent in enacting it. Since the scheme’s enactment, Florida

lawful, and the real racial issue here is that thousands of black people are in prison for far
less serious offenses.
Id.
6. Elizabeth Berenguer Megale, A Call for Change: A Contextual-Configurative Analysis of
Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Laws, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051, 1093 (2014).
7. Elizabeth Berenguer Megale, Disaster Unaverted: Reconciling the Desire for a Safe and
Secure State with the Grim Realities of Stand Your Ground, 37 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 255, 255–56,
286–87, 299 (2013).
8. See Garza, supra note 2.
9. SETHA LOW, BEHIND THE GATES: LIFE, SECURITY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN
FORTRESS AMERICA 137 (2003); Megale, supra note 7, at 288.
10. See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic,
98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 296 (2013) (developing the concept of the “suspicion heuristic” to “explain
the predictable errors in perception, decision-making, and action that can occur when individuals
make judgments of criminality”).
11. The statutory scheme itself explicitly provides for a subjective standard of fear in
determining whether someone is entitled to claim immunity. FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012, 776.013,
776.031, 776.032 (2016); Megale, supra note 7, at 293.
12. Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 332–34.
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courts have wrestled with applying the subjective intent standard.13 Recently,
the Florida Supreme Court utilized a reasonable person standard in
interpreting Stand Your Ground14; in response, the legislature proposed a
number of bills evidencing its original intent to create a subjective fear
standard to protect innocent people from prosecution.15 Although these most
recent bills have not yet successfully passed the legislature, the rhetoric that
supports these proposed bills mirrors the original debates and conversations
that led to the 2005 enactment of Stand Your Ground.16
This Essay concludes by applying cognitive theory to Florida’s Stand
Your Ground laws to explore how implicit bias and outright racism played a
role in its creation. It further posits that the law ratifies endemic racism
because it encourages individuals to rely on their instinctive reactions to
perceived threats when those instinctive reactions are inextricably
intertwined with any combination of long-standing historical racism, overt
discrimination, and implicit bias.

13. The statutory scheme is silent as to procedure and burden of proof. As a result, Florida
courts were faced with interpreting the legislature’s intent, thereby causing confusion and
inconsistency until such matters were decided on appeal to the State’s highest court. See, e.g.,
Bretherick v. Florida, 170 So. 3d 766, 768, 770 (Fla. 2015) (upholding the intermediate court’s
holding that the issue of whether the defendant’s subjective fear was reasonable must be resolved
at a pretrial hearing in which the defendant must prove entitlement to immunity from prosecution
by a preponderance of the evidence and rejecting placement of the prosecution’s burden at less than
a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard); Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 460 (Fla. 2010) (approving
the procedure of a pretrial evidentiary hearing); Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008) (stating that the defendant would bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, entitlement to immunity from prosecution at the pretrial evidentiary hearing); Dennis v.
State, 17 So. 3d 305, 306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the mere existence of disputed
issues of material fact require the denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss). The propriety of the
Florida Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation is the subject of a forthcoming article by the
Author. This Essay confines its analysis to the plain language of the statutory scheme.
14. Bretherick, 170 So. 3d at 770.
15. The Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Bretherick led to a number of bills proposing to
enact different standards. See, e.g., S. 344, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015) (proposing to shift the
burden of proof to the prosecution to disprove a defendant’s immunity claim beyond a reasonable
doubt); S. 1100, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015) (proposing to require an overt act from the
attacker before reasonable force may be used); S. 228, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015) (as filed)
(proposing to prohibit courts from imposing minimum mandatory sentences on defendants that
committed certain acts using a firearm if they find that the defendants subjectively believes the use
of force was justified); S. 228, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015) (as substituted by S. Comm. on
Criminal Justice) (proposing to eliminate aggravated assault from the list of crimes mandating
courts to impose a minimum sentence). Most recently, on March 15, 2017, the Florida Senate voted
to approve CS/SB 128, which requires a court to grant a defendant pretrial immunity unless the
State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not immune. S. 128, 2017 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2017). As of the date of this publication, the Florida House is considering the measure.
SENATE,
CS/SB
128:
Self-Defense
Immunity
Bill
History,
FLA.
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2017/00128 (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
16. Megale, supra note 6, at 1074–76; Megale, supra note 7, at 271–72.
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I. COGNITIVE THEORY
The theory of embodied rationality posits that the human brain cannot
process new and abstract information without first connecting it to an existing
experience.17
Existing life experience provides a framework for
understanding the meaning of new information. Importantly, we do not just
discover the meaning of new information—we construct it.
Metaphors, stereotypes, heuristics, and biases are the building blocks
for constructing reality. Metaphors create neural shortcuts that imply broad
meanings when mere words or shorter phrases are expressed.18 For example,
the phrase “welfare queen” is a metaphor that carries with it certain
implications regarding race, gender, social status, and value.19 Metaphor is
one of the devices by which culturally salient concepts are constructed.20
Stereotypes often arise from metaphors to provide organized pictures of the
world that offer information about entities, relations, objects, and acts.21
Stereotypes do not just provide information about these groups; rather, they
provide the basis for evaluating the value, status, and position of the groups.22
Heuristics are the devices by which the brain utilizes neural shortcuts such as
metaphors and stereotypes to “reduce complex decisions to simpler
assessments.”23 At times, the ultimate assessment produces an incorrect or
wrong conclusion or decision. A bias exists when those wrong conclusions
or decisions are predictable.24
Cognitive science offers insight as to why systemic and covert racism is
so entrenched in modern society. Because the brain filters every new
experience through prior life experiences, perception of events in real time is
affected not only by the event itself but also by prior individual and collective
experience. Research confirms that the brain is “influenced by race, culture,

17. MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN
PERSUASIVE WRITING 259 (2002); see also Linda L. Berger, The Lady, or the Tiger? A Field Guide
to Metaphor and Narrative, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 280–82 (2011); Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot
Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 127, 136 (2008); Jennifer
Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and in a Galaxy Far, Far Away: Using Narrative
to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overreliance on Pure Logic in Appellate Briefs and Motion
Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255, 259 (2009).
18. Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law,
34 BOSTON C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233, 240 (2014) (“[H]uman thought is defined by metaphors.”).
19. Id. at 242–43.
20. Jörg Zinken, Metaphors, Stereotypes, and the Linguistic Picture of the World: Impulses
from the Ethnolinguistic School of Lublin, METAPHORIK.DE, no. 7, 2004, at 115, 120,
http://www.metaphorik.de/en/journal/07/metaphors-stereotypes-and-linguistic-picture-worldimpulses-ethnolinguistic-school-lublin.html.
21. Id. at 116.
22. Id.
23. Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 298.
24. Id.
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and the culture of race.”25 In the context of race, the collective modern
experience has created neural frameworks under which, as a society, certain
beliefs regarding the value of various groups within our society are
commonly held.26 These beliefs have fostered explicit and implicit racial
biases, and this Part analyzes how racial bias evokes false fear.
A. Race as a Social Construct
Though some would argue that we live in a post-racial era and society
is arguably mostly colorblind, numerous social, political, and cultural
institutions are sustained by structurally racist ideologies and practices.
Undoubtedly, race is a relevant factor in nearly every facet of modern life.
But race is not a biological truth; rather, it is a social construct.27
Although race may often be represented through innate physical
characteristics like skin color or face shape, the implications and associated
beliefs about what race means are determined by ever-shifting social
constructs that both influence the meaning of race and are also influenced by
race itself.28
Race matters because we as a society have for centuries said it matters.
It has been the principal tool of social control wielded by dominant White
males since the inception of the American nation.29 Historically, we have
relied on observable racial characteristics, namely skin color, hair texture,
and facial features, to create artificial distinctions and hierarchies designed to
preserve power among wealthy White male elites while systematically
barring vast numbers of minority voices from meaningful participation in

25. Christian M. Halliburton, Race, Brain Science, and Critical Decision-Making in the
Context of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 319, 320 (2012). To support this
conclusion, Halliburton relies on the following studies: William A. Cunningham et al., Separable
Neural Components in the Processing of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 806 (2004)
[hereinafter Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components]; William A. Cunningham et al.,
Implicit and Explicit Ethnocentrism: Revisiting the Ideologies of Prejudice, 30 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332 (2004) [hereinafter Cunningham et al., Implicit and Explicit
Ethnocentrism]; Bernd Wittenbrink et al., Evidence for Racial Prejudice at the Implicit Level and
Its Relationship with Questionnaire Measures, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 262 (1997);
Allen J. Hart et al., Differential Response in the Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs Ingroup
Face Stimuli, 11 NEUROREPORT 2351, 2353–54 (2000); Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to
Threat: Race-Based Patterns of Selective Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322,
1326 (2008); Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation
Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 732 (2000). Professors
Richardson and Goff reach a similar conclusion that “merely perceiving race—even absent racial
animus—can bias judgments of criminality.” Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 296.
26. Cammett, supra note 18, at 242.
27. OMI & WINANT, supra note 1, at 247–49.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 246.
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society.30 Through this process, racial stereotypes have emerged as “carriers
of cultural elements” that inform societal perceptions as to worthiness and
stigma.31 As Michael Omi and Howard Winant explain,
Racialization involved the promotion of certain corporeal
characteristics such as skin color and hair texture to a greater
degree of importance than other presumably “normal” human
variations, such as, say, physical height or eye color. These
phenomic traits, initially associated with African bodies or with
indigenous bodies in the Americas, were soon elevated to the status
of a “fundamental” (and later biological) difference. The
attachment of this process of “othering” to immediately visible
corporeal characteristics facilitated the recognition, surveillance,
and coercion of these people, these “others.” This phenomic
differentiation helped render certain human bodies exploitable and
submissible. It not only distinguished Native Americans and
Africans from Europeans by immediately observable, “ocular”
means; it also occupied the souls and minds that inhabited these
bodies, stripping away not only people’s origins, traditions, and
histories, but also their individuality and differences. In response
to these outrages and assaults, resistance developed from
individual to collective forms, “groupness” or “fusion” grew, and
soon enough also took on a racial framework, if only to face the
white oppressors.32
Prior to Emancipation, the value of Black men was simply that of
“laborers under the supervision of White men.”33 After Emancipation,
however, racial constructs became more complicated as White landowners
navigated the devastating collapse of the plantation economy.34 No longer
property to be controlled by blatant and direct force, Black men and women
were subjected to social control through the construction of negative racial
stereotypes, most of which persist in some form today.
One pervasive belief was that Black men and women lacked the moral
capacity to adequately parent their children. Prior to Emancipation, the slave
owner was in a position to guide and discipline young Black children; postEmancipation, however, the power of the state had to be leveraged “to step

30. OMI & WINANT, supra note 1, at 247; see also Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, #SayHerName
#BlackWomensLivesMatter: State Violence in Policing the Black Female Body, 67 MERCER L. REV.
651, 654–55 (2016).
31. Cammett, supra note 18, at 242 (quoting Silvia Gherardi, Where Learning Is: Metaphors
and Situated Learning in a Planning Group, 53 HUM. REL. 1057, 1062 (2000)).
32. OMI & WINANT, supra note 1, at 247.
33. McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 30, at 662.
34. Id. at 655.
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in and discipline [Black] children for [the] benefit” of the state.35 Thus, the
construct of the Black child as unruly and disobedient rooted itself in shared
cultural norms. Other constructed labels appeared during this time as well.
For example, Black women and girls were considered sexually immoral and
rebellious individuals who incited disobedience in Black men.36 As to Black
men, myths perpetuated the belief that “left to their own devices, Black men
were criminals with a predilection to rape White women, burn down their
former masters’ homes and farms (arson), and murder to cover up robbery.”37
The impact of Emancipation on the Black man was to construct him as a
criminal.38 This construct led to the incarceration of Black individuals at an
alarming rate, and as prisons became disproportionately black they became
the principle vehicle for “funneling Black labor back to the State.”39
Although the current system of policing and incarceration “functions
exactly as intended”40—to create a ready supply of forced labor postslavery—the cognitive impact on society has extended far beyond this model.
The average person does not necessarily think of prisons as holding a ready
labor market. On the contrary, the common belief is that prisons are filled
with “the dregs of society,” the worst monsters who harm society rather than
contributing meaningfully to our social compact.41 What is more, society
generally believes that people who are arrested deserve to be arrested and are
in fact bad people.42
In short, the post-slavery myth of the Black man as a danger to society,
which was perpetuated to create a ready labor source for the newly-bankrupt
White landowners, has created salient and widely-accepted cultural elements
that Black men are in fact dangerous criminals. Code words and phrases
35. Id. at 659 (citing DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE,
REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 26–30 (1997)).
36. Id. at 660–62.
37. Id. at 662 (citing PHILLIP A. BRUCE, THE PLANTATION NEGRO AS A FREEMAN 57, 92
(1889)).
38. “The Negro element is the most criminal in our population . . . . The Negro is much more
criminal as a free man than he was as a slave.” W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, SOME NOTES ON
NEGRO CRIME PARTICULARLY IN GEORGIA 9 (1904).
39. McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 30, at 665–66.
40. Id. at 701.
41. Christopher O’Connor, The Inmate I Can’t Forget: I Thought Prison Inmates Were the
Dregs of Society, Until I Became One of Them, SALON (Dec. 29, 2015, 6:00 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2015/12/29/the_inmate_i_cant_forget_i_thought_prison_inmates_were_the
_dregs_of_society_until_i_became_one_of_them/.
42. For example, one contributor to The Federalist stated, “Every time I hear of a black man
being killed by the cops, he’s almost always a criminal thug I have no desire to defend.” John
Gibbs, If You Don’t Want Police to Shoot You, Don’t Resist Arrest, FEDERALIST (July 11, 2016),
http://thefederalist.com/2016/07/11/if-you-dont-want-police-to-shoot-you-dont-resist-arrest/. But
see Virginia Hughes, How Many People Are Wrongly Convicted? Researchers Do the Math, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 28, 2014), http://phenomena.nationalgeographic.com/2014/04/28/how-manypeople-are-wrongly-convicted-researchers-do-the-math/.
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often reveal the suspicion heuristic at work. Words like “thug” and “felon”
readily call to mind images of a menacing Black man while words like
“innocent” and “victim” conjure images of White people.43 Notably, the
word “criminal” has become synonymous with Black man, and, by the same
token, the Black man is one and the same as Criminal.44
B. Race and Fear
Certainly, society has made substantial progress in snuffing out the
blight of overt racism. In the modern era, explicit racial discrimination is far
less rampant than it was at the time of Emancipation, but implicit biases
continue to infiltrate nearly every aspect of life. The problem is that “race
bias, at least as it can be suggested by or measured in brain activity, is
extremely elusive, being both implicit and unconscious.”45
The suspicion heuristic explains how these biases result from “the
predictable errors in perception, decision-making, and action that can occur
when individuals make judgments of criminality.”46 A “judgment of
criminality” is “the assessment that another is engaged in criminal activity or
poses a threat.”47 Studies reveal that the mere perception of race can bias
judgments in criminality despite the absence of racial animus or overt
racism.48 The centuries-old message has been consistent: people of color,
especially Black men, ought to be feared. As a result, “[B]lack individuals
are both more likely to be perceived as threatening, and more difficult to
perceive as non-threatening, than white individuals.”49

43. OMI & WINANT, supra note 1, at 256. In 2014, Seattle Seahawks cornerback Richard
Sherman explicitly addressed the use of “thug” as a code word for the “N-word.” Ryan Wilson,
Richard Sherman: ‘Thug’ Is Accepted Way of Calling Someone the N-word, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 22,
2014),
http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/richard-sherman-thug-is-accepted-way-of-callingsomeone-n-word/. He “was asked if ‘thug,’ a word that was used often on message boards and
social media to describe the Seahawks cornerback, bothers him more than any other term.” Id.
Sherman responded, “The reason it bothers me is because it seems like it’s an accepted way of
calling somebody the N-word now.” Id. He continued, “It’s like everybody else said the N-word
and then they say ‘thug’ and that’s fine. It kind of takes me aback and it’s kind of disappointing
because they know.” Id.
44. Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 304 (“That is, as ‘Black’ activates thoughts of
criminality, so too does criminality activate thoughts of Blackness, each strengthening the
association between the two.”).
45. Halliburton, supra note 25, at 329.
46. Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 296.
47. Id. at 310.
48. Id. at 296.
49. Halliburton, supra note 25, at 328 (citing Joshua Correll et al., Event-Related Potentials
and the Decision to Shoot: The Role of Threat Perception and Cognitive Control, 42 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 120 (2006); Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma:
Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY& SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1314, 1314–15 (2002)).
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In one study, scientists analyzed amygdala responses to race and
discovered that “race, as perceived by the subject brain, produces high rates
of amygdala arousal, just as if that brain were dealing with an emotionally
charged experience.”50 This perception of race activates the amygdala,
triggering an emotional response and affecting trust determinations.
Furthermore, “amygdala activity can reinforce implicit bias and . . . implicit
bias and trust determinations are likewise directly correlated.”51 Thus,
“[w]hen subjects make decisions that heavily depend on amygdala and
striatum inputs—such as whether to ‘shoot’ or ‘not shoot’ a particular
target—the outcomes clearly correlate with the race of that target.”52
The suspicion heuristic reveals the disturbing truth that, to a large extent,
human beings are so affected by the existence of bias that it is impossible to
escape its influence. The suspicion heuristic provides:
The decisions of the best-intentioned individuals may be affected
by the mere existence of the stereotype because of the associative
networks our minds use to process information. That is, merely
being aware of the stereotype is sufficient to be influenced by it in
ways that disadvantage those stereotyped as criminal, regardless of
the perceiver’s intentions or character. Even worse, people’s
heuristic-criminality judgment will feel easy, familiar, and true
because they cannot evaluate information processes that proceed
beneath awareness.53
Even police officers, who are trained to objectively assess danger,
cannot readily escape the influence of implicit bias and the suspicion
heuristic. Police officers rely on their ability to accurately predict whatever
threat a suspect may pose, but race inevitably distorts their perception even
when they are well-trained and consciously unbiased. One reason is that
“[t]here is a persistent and irrational expectation and perception of heightened
propensity for violence and criminality in black men, and these expectations
operate on the brain’s information processing mechanisms to instantly, but
invisibly, color our judgment.”54 Second, race perceptions trigger the

50. Id. at 326 (footnote omitted) (citing Hart et al., supra note 25, at 2351, 2353; Phelps et al.,
supra note 25, at 732).
51. Id. at 327 (citing Damian A. Stanley et al., Implicit Race Attitudes Predict Trustworthiness
Judgments and Economic Trust Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7710, 7711–12 (2011);
M. van’t Wout & A.G. Sanfey, Friend or Foe: The Effect of Implicit Trustworthiness Judgments in
Social Decision-Making, 108 COGNITION 796, 801–02 (2008)).
52. Id. at 328 (Phelps et al., supra note 25, at 733).
53. Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 311 (emphasis added).
54. Halliburton, supra note 25, at 333 (footnote omitted) (first citing Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934, 950 (1984); and
then citing E. Ashby Plant et al., Selective Responses to Threat: The Roles of Race and Gender in
Decisions to Shoot, 37 PERSONALTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1274, 1274–79 (2011); E. Ashby

2017]

THE COLOR OF FEAR

735

amygdala to initiate an emotional response “resulting in the increased role of
negative emotion in generating meaning and choosing responsive action.”55
Thus, even a highly-trained, seemingly unbiased officer likely will
unavoidably perceive a suspect of color as a greater threat, less trustworthy,
and more fearsome than a White suspect.
Although not all implicit biases are problematic, the effect of the
suspicion heuristic necessarily harms minorities, and especially Black men.56
Specifically, Black men “serve as our mental prototype (i.e., stereotype) for
the violent street criminal.”57 The ready availability of this stereotype is due
both to society’s historical portrayal of the Black man as Criminal and the
continued exaggerated media portrayals of Black men as Thugs perpetuating
violent street crime.58 The very existence of the stereotype inevitably triggers
the suspicion heuristic.59 Examples of this pervasive bias are ubiquitous.
Consider the following non-exhaustive exemplary list:
1. Tamir Rice, a twelve-year-old Black boy, was shot and killed in
November 2014, by Officer Timothy Loehmann.60 Rice was playing with a
toy gun in the park.61 Officers responded to a report that a boy was playing
with a gun.62 Loehmann shot and killed Rice, claiming that he believed Rice
had a real gun.63 After shooting him, Loehmann did not seek medical
attention for Rice.64
2. Trayvon Martin, a seventeen-year-old Black boy, was shot and killed
on February 26, 2012, by George Zimmerman, a self-appointed vigilante
neighborhood watchman.65 Zimmerman claimed Martin was suspicious
because he was a young Black male, dressed in a hoodie, and walking in his
neighborhood.66 Martin was temporarily visiting his father and his father’s
Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers’ Responses to Criminal
Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180, 180–84 (2005)).
55. Id. at 334 (citing R.J. Dolan, Emotion, Cognition, and Behavior, 298 SCIENCE 1192, 1191
(2002)).
56. Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 301, 310.
57. Id. at 310 (citing Correll et al., supra note 49, at 1314–15; Danny Osborne, Perceived
Stereotypicality and Eyewitness Memory: Does the Type of Crime Affect Eyewitness Identifications?
62–63 (May 27, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Michael Pearson, Tamir Rice Shooting: Cleveland to Pay $6 Million to Settle Family’s
Lawsuit, CNN (Apr. 25, 2016, 10:56 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/25/us/tamir-ricesettlement/.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Charles M. Blow, The Curious Case of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/opinion/blow-the-curious-case-of-trayvon-martin.html?_r=0.
66. Id.
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girlfriend who lived in that community.67 He had every right to be walking
there.68
3. Jordan Davis, a seventeen-year-old Black boy, was shot and killed in
September 2012, by Michael Dunn.69 Dunn had ordered Davis and his
friends to lower the music in their SUV.70 They refused and Dunn fired
multiple shots at the SUV as it drove away.71 Dunn claimed he was scared
of the Black teenagers even though they had no weapons and were driving
away.72
4. Michael Brown, an eighteen-year-old Black man, was shot and killed
on August 9, 2014, by Officer Darren Wilson.73 Brown was walking down
the street when Wilson ordered him to move onto the sidewalk.74 When
Brown walked away from Wilson, Wilson fired multiple shots at Brown who
had retreated to the ground with his hands up.75
5. Philando Castile, a thirty-two-year-old Black man, was shot and
killed on July 16, 2016, by Officer Jeronimo Yanez.76 Yanez pulled over
Castile under the auspices of citing him for a broken taillight.77 As Castile
attempted to produce his ID as Yanez had requested, Yanez feared Castile
was reaching for his gun and shot Castile multiple times.78 Castile’s
girlfriend and her young daughter were in the car, witnessed the entire
incident, and were prevented from providing aid to Castile.79 Castile died
later that night.80

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Paul Solotaroff, A Most American Way to Die, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/jordan-davis-stand-your-grounds-latest-victim20130425.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-afterpolice-shooting.html.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Mitch Smith & Timothy Williams, Minnesota Police Officer’s ‘Bulletproof Warrior’
TIMES
(July
14,
2016),
Training
Is
Questioned,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/us/minnesota-police-officers-bulletproof-warrior-training-isquestioned.html.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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6. Alton Sterling, a thirty-seven-year-old Black man, was shot and
killed on July 5, 2016, by police officers in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.81
Officers responded to a report that he had a gun and was outside a Louisiana
store selling CDs.82 Upon arrival, they pushed him onto the hood of a car
and then to the ground.83 After restraining him, officers shot him multiple
times.84
7. Eric Garner, a forty-three-year-old Black man, was killed on July 17,
2014, by police officers in Staten Island, New York.85 Officers stopped him
under suspicion that he was unlawfully selling cigarettes.86 Five officers
pushed him to the ground and physically restrained him.87 Garner repeatedly
told officers he could not breathe, but the officers did not loosen the neck
hold.88 He died one hour later due to the compression of the neck hold.89
8. Mario Woods, a twenty-six-year-old Black man, was shot and killed
on December 2, 2015, by police officers in San Francisco, California.90
Officers stopped him under suspicion that he had been involved in a stabbing
earlier that day.91 Woods was in possession of a knife, and officers ordered
him to put it down. When he refused to put down his knife five officers
surrounded him, fired their guns, and shot him twenty times, killing him.92
9. Walter Scott, a fifty-year-old Black man, was shot and killed on April
4, 2015, by Officer Michael Slager.93 Scott fled from officers after being

81. Joshua Berlinger et al., Alton Sterling Shooting: Homeless Man Made 911 Call, Source
Says, CNN (July 8, 2016, 7:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/us/baton-rouge-altonsterling-shooting/.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Medical Examiner Rules Eric Garner’s Death a Homicide, Says He Was Killed by
Chokehold, NBC 4 N.Y. (Aug. 21, 2014, 7:20 AM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/EricGarner-Chokehold-Police-Custody-Cause-of-Death-Staten-Island-Medical-Examiner269396151.html.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.; James Queally, Man’s Death After Apparent Chokehold by NYPD Officer to Be
Probed, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2014, 11:16 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-nann-nypd-choking-death-20140718-story.html.
90. Julia Carrie Wong, Mario Woods, Black Man Killed by Police, ‘Had 20 Gunshot Wounds’,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2016, 6:08 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/feb/12/mariowoods-autopsy-san-francisco-police-fatal-shooting.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Bruce Smith, Correction: Police Officer—Fatal Shooting Story, A.P. (Apr. 10, 2015, 10:29
PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/d67e289fc6a64c2896365719826a294b/white-sc-officercharged-murder-shooting-black-man.
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pulled over on a traffic stop.94 Slager pursued Scott, tased him, and then shot
him in the back as Scott ran away.95
10. Dontre Hamilton, a thirty-one-year-old Black man, was shot and
killed on April 30, 2014, by Officer Christopher Manney.96 Manney
responded to a report that Hamilton was sleeping on a park bench.97
Hamilton began to resist Manney’s pat down, and Manney pulled out his
baton to subdue Hamilton.98 After Hamilton gained control of the baton,
Manney pulled his gun and shot Hamilton fourteen times.99
11. John Crawford, a twenty-two-year-old Black man, was shot and
killed on August 5, 2014, by police officers in Dayton, Ohio.100 Crawford
was shopping in Wal-Mart when a customer called 911 to report him carrying
a gun.101 Crawford had picked up a pellet gun that was out of its package and
sitting on a shelf, and then continued to walk around the Wal-Mart.102 When
police arrived, they shot Crawford dead in the store.103
12. Rumain Brisbon, a thirty-four-year-old Black man, was shot and
killed on December 2, 2014, by Officer Mark Rine.104 Officers stopped him
under suspicion that he was involved in an illegal drug transaction.105
Officers ordered Brisbon to put his hands in the air, but Brisbon put them in
his waistband instead.106 The officer engaged Brisbon in a physical scuffle,
and after they fell into Brisbon’s girlfriend’s apartment, the officer shot
Brisbon twice in the chest.107

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Aamer Madhani, No Charges for Milwaukee Officer Who Shot Man 14 Times, USA TODAY
(Dec. 22, 2014, 3:15 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/22/policeshooting-milwaukee/20760011/.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Elahe Izadi, Ohio Wal-Mart Surveillance Video Shows Police Shooting and Killing John
Crawford III, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2014/09/25/ohio-wal-mart-surveillance-video-shows-police-shooting-and-killing-johncrawford-iii/?utm_term=.555383b0addc.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. No Charges for Phoenix Policeman in Shooting of Unarmed Black Man, AL JAZEERA AM.
(Apr. 1, 2015, 10:40 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/1/no-charges-for-phoenixpoliceman-in-shooting-unarmed-black-man.html.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.; Megan Cassidy, Unarmed Arizona Man Killed by Cop, USA TODAY (Dec. 4 2014,
11:34 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/04/phoenix-police-unarmedman-killed-by-officer/19878931/; Terrence McCoy, The Story of How a White Phoenix Cop Killed
an
Unarmed
Black
Man,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
5,
2014),
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13. Jerame Reid, a thirty-six-year-old Black male was shot and killed
on December 30, 2014, by Officer Braheme Days.108 He was traveling as a
passenger in a car pulled over for allegedly running a stop sign.109 Reid exited
the car with his hands in the air when Officer Days shot seven rounds, all of
which hit Reid.110
14. Charles Kinsey, a forty-seven-year-old Black male, was shot on
July 18, 2016, by Officer Jonathan Aledda.111 Kinsey was working as a
behavioral therapist attempting to retrieve one of his patients who had run
away from the group home.112 Police received a report that someone was
walking around with a gun, but when they arrived, they observed Kinsey
standing over his patient trying to get him to return to the nearby group
home.113 Officers pointed their guns and fired at Kinsey after he laid on the
ground with his hands in the air.114 Kinsey required medical attention for his
gunshot wounds.115
Compare these examples to that of William Bruce Ray, a sixty-twoyear-old White male.116 An officer observed Ray on the side of the road
pointing a shotgun at passing cars.117 The officer approached Ray and
managed to remove the shotgun as well as a handgun from him.118 Although
Ray fired a shot at the officer, the officer did not shoot Ray.119
These examples evidence a disturbing phenomenon: Black men and
boys are killed at alarmingly high rates compared to White men, even under
circumstances where Black men are unarmed and exhibiting submissive
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/12/05/how-a-white-phoenix-copkilled-an-unarmed-black-man/.
108. Thomas Barlas, Police Video Shows Details of Fatal Bridgeton Shooting, PRESS ATLANTIC
CITY (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/police-video-shows-details-offatal-bridgeton-shooting/article_ea83a22a-a106-11e4-bb55-1be3f9fb51cf.html.
109. Id.; Andy Polhamus, Bridgeton Cops Won’t Be Charged in Fatal Shooting, Grand Jury
Decides, NJ.COM (Aug. 20, 2015, 11:10 AM), http://www.nj.com/cumberland/index.ssf/2015/
08/no_charges_for_bridgeton_cops_involved_in_fatal_sh.html.
110. Barlas, supra note 108; Polhamus, supra note 109.
111. Charles Rabin, Cop Shoots Caretaker of Autistic Man Playing in the Street with Toy Truck,
MIAMI HERALD (July 20, 2016, 7:34 PM) [hereinafter Rabin, Cop Shoots Caretaker],
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article90905442.html; Charles Rabin, Charles
Kinsey Was Shot Less than Six Minutes After Police Arrived, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 5, 2016, 5:22
PM) [hereinafter Rabin, Six Minutes], http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article94009
242.html.
112. Rabin, Cop Shoots Caretaker, supra note 111; Rabin, Six Minutes, supra note 111.
113. Rabin, Cop Shoots Caretaker, supra note 111; Rabin, Six Minutes, supra note 111.
114. Rabin, Cop Shoots Caretaker, supra note 111; Rabin, Six Minutes, supra note 111.
115. Rabin, Cop Shoots Caretaker, supra note 111.
116. Raleigh Man Fires Handgun at Wake County Deputy, CBS N.C. (July 6, 2016, 1:58 PM),
http://wncn.com/2016/07/06/raleigh-man-fires-handgun-at-wake-county-deputy/.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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behavior. The suspicion heuristic120 explains why this phenomenon
repeatedly occurs despite decreased explicit racism and increased awareness
of implicit bias, and how even individuals who consciously reject stereotypes
make racially-biased judgments.121
Presently, “linking non-Whites with criminality is cognitively easy”122
because, as a society, we have spent centuries accepting myths that people of
color are dangerous and ought to be feared. That mode of thinking has
created deeply embedded neural pathways that influence the picture we
create of others and how we evaluate their value, position, and status. This
canalization cannot be easily undone.123 Even when we are aware of the
potential bias, we cannot escape being influenced and acting in response to
that bias because it functions beneath awareness.124 In short, our brains tell
us that being afraid of a person of color is more reasonable, on the whole,
than being afraid of a White person.125
II. FLORIDA’S STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS REQUIRE SUBJECTIVE
INTERPRETATION OF FEAR THAT NECESSARILY PERPETUATES DEEPLYENTRENCHED RACIAL BIAS
The suspicion heuristic has been used to analyze self-defense statutes
that employ a reasonable person standard for evaluating the legality of the
use of force.126 To summarize, the suspicion heuristic “suggests that using
race as a proxy for suspicion is not unusual or unexpected.”127 Therefore,
even in hindsight, the use of force seems more reasonable when the victim is
a person of color, especially a Black man, than when the victim is White.
Under a reasonable person analysis, courts excuse or justify behavior
consistent with these kinds of typical mistakes that the average person could
make.128 The positivist model suggests that it would be unfair to punish
individuals for acting consistently with commonly held beliefs and “that
punishment should be reserved for those who make mistakes that the average
person could have avoided.”129
The failure to punish behavior consistent with the suspicion heuristic,
however, is problematic for at least three reasons. “First, typical beliefs are
120. Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 296.
121. Id. at 311–12.
122. Id. at 313.
123. Megale, supra note 7, at 262 n.35.
124. Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 311.
125. Id. at 313–14.
126. See, e.g., id. at 314.
127. Id. at 315–16.
128. Id. at 318 n.158.
129. Id. at 319 (citing Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
1, 30 (1994)).

2017]

THE COLOR OF FEAR

741

not necessarily morally correct or just. . . . Second, characterizing mistakes
facilitated by the heuristic as reasonable represents a judgment that the
mistake is acceptable. . . . Third, applying the positivist model to cases
implicating the suspicion heuristic is problematic because the heuristic is
pervasive.”130 This Section demonstrates that these problems are magnified
in jurisdictions that employ a subjective standard to evaluate the legality of
use of force.
Although the reasonable person standard is the majority rule for most
Stand Your Ground laws, Florida’s codified Stand Your Ground laws call for
a subjective analysis.131 The three relevant statutes are Sections 776.012,
776.013, and 776.032. Section 776.012 codifies “Stand Your Ground” in that
it permits the use of force, without imposing a duty to retreat, when “the
person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself
or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful [or deadly]
force.”132 Section 776.012 codifies the “Castle Doctrine” and creates a
presumption that an individual “held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of
death or great bodily harm” when acting in self-defense in the person’s home
or vehicle.133 Section 776.032 codifies “Immunity” and prevents prosecution
of anyone acting pursuant to Stand Your Ground or the Castle Doctrine.134

130. Id. at 319–20 (footnote omitted) (citing Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of
Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781,
815 (1994)).
131. See Martin v. State, 110 So. 3d 936, 939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (acknowledging that
“[e]vidence that [defend]ant’s delirium arguably caused him to believe his life was in danger” was
relevant to self-defense claim); see also supra notes 13–15 (discussing the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision in Bretherick v. Florida, 170 So. 3d 766, 768 (Fla. 2015), and the legislature’s response).
132. FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012(1)-(2) (2016). That statute provides:
Use or threatened use of force in defense of person
(1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against
another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is
necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of
unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this
subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force.
(2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably
believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death
or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent imminent death or great
bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a
forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with
this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground
if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal
activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be.
Id.
133. Id. § 776.013.
134. Id. § 776.032. The text of the statute provides:
Immunity from criminal prosecution and civil action for justifiable use or threatened use
of force
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Prior to 2005, Florida’s self-defense statutory scheme imposed a duty to
retreat on individuals who reasonably feared the threat of violence outside
the castle, and reasonable fear was measured by the reasonable person
yardstick. Since 2005, however, a person who experiences a threat is no
longer required to retreat when threatened, and the question is no longer
whether a reasonable person would have felt afraid under the circumstances.
Rather, the question is whether this person’s subjective fear was reasonable
based on that person’s individual perceptions and experience.135 This
conclusion becomes obvious when the Stand Your Ground statute is read en
pari materia with the immunity statute.136
Although Section 776.012 utilizes the phrase “reasonably believes,”
immunity would have no operative effect if the person using force were
required to justify the act under a reasonable person standard. In Stand Your
Ground, the legislature intended to create broad protections for individuals
who believe it necessary to use force against another.137 In lobbying for its
passage, Marion Hammer (then president of the NRA and author of the
legislative scheme) told Florida lawmakers that “[y]ou can’t expect a victim
to wait before taking action to protect herself, and say: ‘Excuse me, Mr.
Criminal, did you drag me into this alley to rape and kill me or do you just
want to beat me up and steal my purse?’”138

(1) A person who uses or threatens to use force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or
s. 776.031 is justified in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil
action for the use or threatened use of such force by the person, personal representative,
or heirs of the person against whom the force was used or threatened, unless the person
against whom force was used or threatened is a law enforcement officer, as defined in s.
943.10(14), who was acting in the performance of his or her official duties and the officer
identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law or the person using or
threatening to use force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law
enforcement officer. As used in this subsection, the term “criminal prosecution” includes
arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant.
(2) A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the use or
threatened use of force as described in subsection (1), but the agency may not arrest the
person for using or threatening to use force unless it determines that there is probable
cause that the force that was used or threatened was unlawful.
(3) The court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, compensation for loss
of income, and all expenses incurred by the defendant in defense of any civil action
brought by a plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant is immune from prosecution as
provided in subsection (1).
Id.
135. Megale, supra note 7, at 299.
136. See id. at 267 (explaining the effect of coupling Sections 776.012 and 776.032).
137. See id. at 260 (quoting Representative Baxely on the law’s purpose).
138. Ann O’Neill, NRA’s Marion Hammer Stands Her Ground, CNN (Apr. 15, 2012, 9:20 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/15/us/marion-hammer-profile/index.html.
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The whole purpose of immunity is to ensure that a victim is not required
to justify the belief that the Other is a Criminal who intends to harm.139 The
immunity statute reflects this intent that people claiming self-defense ought
not be prosecuted at all.140 As recently as October 2015, the legislature
proposed legislation that would clarify that “[i]mmunity from prosecution is
different than the defense of justifiable use of force. Essentially, immunity
absolves a person from criminal liability and the person has no risk of
conviction of the crime for which immunity has been granted.”141
In essence, the reasonable person standard renders the immunity statute
entirely meaningless in Florida because every victim would have to
satisfactorily explain to some authoritative body, presumably a court, the
circumstances surrounding the belief so that a determination could be made
as to its reasonableness.142 In other words, figuring out whether a fear is
objectively reasonable necessarily requires prosecution, which wholly
circumvents and effectively nullifies the immunity statute.143 On the other
hand, applying a subjective standard would not demand that a prosecution
occur in every case because law enforcement would be required to accept the
victim’s assertion of fear absent evidence that the fear did not in fact exist.
The subjective fear standard, however, when viewed through the lens of
the suspicion heuristic, still suffers from the three previously identified
problems: (1) it allows cases to be decided based on beliefs that “are not
necessarily morally correct or just”; (2) it condones “mistakes facilitated by
the heuristic as reasonable”; and (3) allows the underlying biases to continue
permeating society.144 What is more, these problems were salient at the
creation of the law and persist now in its operation.
Florida’s Stand Your Ground was designed to protect “innocent people”
from prosecution when they protected themselves from Criminals.145 The
research and debate leading to the laws’ enactment reveal the pervasiveness
of the suspicion heuristic. The legislature advanced an exaggerated story
about James Workman who had shot and killed someone he believed was

139. See Megale, supra note 7, at 271 (discussing how the preponderance of evidence burden
for a pretrial assertion of immunity “undermines the very purpose of immunity”).
140. See Bretherick v. Florida, 170 So. 3d 766, 775 (Fla. 2015) (recognizing that the goal of a
defendant asserting pretrial immunity seeks “to avoid criminal prosecution”).
141. S. COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR
S.B. 344, 2016 Leg., 118th Sess., at 2 (Fla. 2015), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill
/2016/0344/Analyses/2016s0344.rc.PDF.
142. See S.B. 344, 2016 Leg., 118th Sess. (Fla. 2015) (describing the evidentiary burden on
defendants as “substantially curtail[ing] the benefit” of immunity).
143. See Megale, supra note 7, at 267 (discussing barriers to prosecution created by immunity).
144. Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 319–20.
145. Megale, supra note 7, at 258 (statement of Florida State House Representative Dennis
Baxley); Megale, supra note 6, at 1076–77.

744

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 76:726

attempting to break into his camper.146 Although Mr. Workman was never
charged, proponents of the bill employed code words to generate fear that
Innocent (read: White) People live in perpetual danger of attack by Criminals
(read: Blacks).147 The solution to this danger, they said, was twofold: (1) arm
“ourselves” (Us=Whites) against “them” (Other=Black); and (2) protect Us
from prosecution when we kill the Other.148 This narrative took root because
the pervasiveness of the suspicion heuristic made the story “easy, familiar,
and true.”149
Furthermore, the legislature sought to normalize and cast as reasonable
the notion that Innocent People should be able to kill Criminals without
consequence. Though not morally correct or just, Criminal is synonymous
with Black Man.150 Regardless of whether members of the legislature
consciously rejected the stereotype, they must have been unavoidably
affected by it. The fear response triggered by the code words and narrative
would have been a very real experience to the legislators as they digested the
Workman/Innocent vs. Criminal narrative. Furthermore, the desire to
completely absolve the Innocent of criminal liability communicates
acceptance of the suspicion heuristic and the Black Man as Criminal.
As applied, the very existence of the law condones and perpetuates bias.
By immunizing the Innocent from prosecution, the law ratifies violent
behavior triggered by irrational yet uncontrollable fear of the Other.
Numerous studies show that when confronted by a Black man, most human
beings experience a strong negative emotional reaction in the amygdala.151
This biological response reveals deeply entrenched beliefs about Black men
that have been perpetuated over centuries. The suspicion heuristic is
pervasive and inescapable even by those who consciously reject racism and
bias. If even well-trained officers are unable to stop the biological implicit
bias response, certainly lay individuals who are not trained at all will be even
more susceptible to the fear, however irrational, automatically generated by
the amygdala.
Additionally, Florida’s Stand Your Ground signals to the public that the
suspicion heuristic is acceptable. The law seeks to absolve Innocent People
of criminal liability when they kill Criminals. The immunity statute
communicates that behavior consistent with the suspicion heuristic ought not
be punished, effectively condoning the suspicion heuristic itself. The law
146. Megale, supra note 7, at 259–60; Megale, supra note 6, at 1076.
147. Megale, supra note 7, at 258–60.
148. Id.; O’Neill, supra note 138.
149. Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 311 (emphasis added).
150. See supra Part I.A.
151. See, e.g., Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components, supra note 25; Cunningham
et al., Implicit and Explicit Ethnocentrism, supra note 25; Hart et al., supra note 25, at 2353–54;
Trawalter et al., supra note 25, at 1326; Phelps et al., supra note 25, at 732.
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assumes Innocent People possess beliefs that are moral, just, and correct, but
the suspicion heuristic informs us that beliefs about Criminals are not
necessarily moral, just, or correct. In fact, stereotypes about Criminals have
created dangerous collective cultural beliefs that Blacks are less worthy than
Whites.152
Moreover, Florida’s Stand Your Ground perpetuates implicit bias in the
most insidious of ways. Implicit bias operates silently and below the surface.
Most individuals are unaware of their own biases, and the theory of embodied
rationality informs that even those who are aware of their biases cannot help
but be impacted by them. In the absence of immunity, individuals are at least
forced to question the rationality of their behavior. Knowing that prosecution
is a risk when you kill someone tempers your behavior. It forces you to more
carefully assess whether the fear even exists. In Florida, though, the law now
protects individuals from being questioned about the reasonableness of their
claimed fear, so their need to self-assess the rationality of the fear itself is
diminished. The result is that the suspicion heuristic is not being questioned
either externally or internally. Racism is therefore perpetuated because the
silent, below-the-surface implicit bias is further hidden from consciousness
because there is no reason to question its very existence.
III. CONCLUSION
Law often functions as a mirror of societal values at a given point in
time, but it is also a tool of social construction operating to either reinforce
generally acceptable norms or to redefine norms that are no longer generally
accepted.153 Through its use of the subjective fear standard, Florida’s Stand
Your Ground functions as a tool of social construction in that it reinforces
deeply entrenched racial bias and perpetuates racism by condoning and
ratifying behavior consistent with the suspicion heuristic. In this way, it not
only declares as acceptable those behaviors that are influenced by racial bias,
but it also perpetuates racial bias by further burying individual awareness that
the bias even exists.
Study after study confirms that Black men, by virtue of their race, are
the most feared individuals in society.154 The theory of embodied rationality

152. See supra Part I.A.
153. Megale, supra note 6, at 1065.
154. See Alison Hewitt, A ‘Black’-Sounding Name Makes People Imagine a Larger, More
Dangerous Person, UCLA Study Shows, UCLA NEWSROOM (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/a-black-sounding-name-makes-people-imagine-a-larger-moredangerous-person-ucla-study-shows; Michel Martin, Fear of the Black Man: How Racial Bias
Could
Affect
Crime,
Labor
Rates,
NPR
(Mar.
30,
2015,
5:38
PM),
http://www.npr.org/2015/03/30/396405061/fear-of-the-black-man-how-racial-bias-could-affectcrime-labor-rates; see also Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components, supra note 25;
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confirms that Americans experience a fear response based on race, a
germane, innate biological characteristic that cannot possibly accurately
communicate whether the other person is a threat. The suspicion heuristic
explains the negative decisions and behaviors that result from the irrational
fear created by deep-seated, largely invisible, racial bias.
Viewed through the lens of embodied rationality and particularly the
suspicion heuristic, Florida’s Stand Your Ground statutory scheme condones,
ratifies, reinforces, and perpetuates both overt and implicit racial bias.
American culture is long overdue for major shifts in how it views and
perceives race. Until law forces individuals to face the realities of racial bias,
however, deep-seated beliefs about the value of Black lives, and the lives of
other minorities, will continue to breed in the dark recesses of our minds.

Cunningham et al., Implicit and Explicit Ethnocentrism, supra note 25; Hart et al., supra note 25,
at 2353–54; Trawalter et al., supra note 25, at 1326; Phelps et al., supra note 25, at 732.

